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1. SADCC's aims are set out in its 1980 founding Lusaka Declaration as:
<
a. reducing external dependence, especially but not only on the Republic 
of South Africa
b. building a structure of viable and equitable regional cooperation
c. mobilising resources to carry out these aims
d. presenting the Southern African development goals/approaches to 
potential cooperating partners and engaging in dialogue with them.
2. The first goal has been interpreted - in part because of the far worse 
international economic environment and levels of South African aggression 
than projected in 1979/80 - as involving a first stage of switching or 
diversifying dependence away from South Africa.
3. The second has focussed on identifying and acting on perceived common 
interests which can be pursued more effectively (or only) in common and 
which relate more or less directly to dependence reduction and in 
particular to reducing vulnerability to South African economic 
destabilisation. The initial priorities of transport and food security 
(broadly defined) appear in* the Lusaka Declaration as, with lower 
prominence, do trade, energy, manufacturing and - with marked 
qualifications - a development finance institution. These are set out in 
more detail in the Programme of Action originally issued with the 
Declaration and now updated annually.
2This approach flows from two perceptions:
a. neo-classic free trade areas/common markets - in which all SADCC 
member States were or had been included - tended to lead to such 
unequal gains (and indeed net losses to some members) as to be 
unsustainable;
b. perceived common interests were - at least initially - more likely to 
lie in coordinated production (of transport services, energy, 
knowledge as well as visible goods) than in trade which was and is 
seen as an important consequential means to validate the gains rather 
than as a primary goal in and of itself.
5. The concentration on transport is based on an analysis of dependence on 
and vulnerability to RSA as forming an arch of interaction elements the 
keystone of which is dependence on transport routes through RSA. That 
dependence in part dates back to the 19 th Century Transvaal 
Repubiic-Delagoa Bay line and Cape Colony-Bechuanaland (Botswana)-British 
South Africa Co. (Zimbabwe) route. But its rise to dominance came after 
1965 first as a result of UDI and was subsequently sustained by South 
African destruction (directly or by proxy forces) of lines transitting 
Angola and Mozambique. This analysis is more than incidentally shared by 
official South Africa albeit it takes a very different view as to its 
merits.
6. Because external dependence - especially on RSA - and regional 
fragmentation had been created by states and large enterprises SADCC 
viewed the necessary main instrument for its gradual dismantling as 
selective state intervention. This focus was and is largely at state to 
state level in transport, energy and food security/agriculture but 
includes action to build up state/external enterprise and domestic 
enterprise/external enterprise relations in manufacturing, trade, 
tourism, mining.
37. SADCC - whose commitment to self-respect and self-reliance as well as its 
analysis of international economic relations as basically interest (not 
altruism) based causes it to avoid the word "donor” - has always believed 
that putting its case to the international community of potential 
cooperating partners by presentation and dialogue and mobilising support 
from that community were crucial to its making rapid progress. They have 
become more crucial than envisaged because the external economic 
setting's negative changes after 1980 (in some cases exacerbated by slow 
national responses) made new programmes (like those coordinated through 
SADCC) very heavily contingent on external resources for import and 
sometimes local content finance while the escalation of RSA 
destabilisation and aggression from early 1981 raised the need for 
finance to offset damage done (especially to transport) and also for 
external friends able and willing to 'lean on' South Africa.
8. SADCC was sponsored by and is the economic affiliate of the Front Line 
States. The FLS comprise six of its nine member States, i.e. Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe together with the 
other three independent states, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland and with 
Namibia virtually certain to become the 10th member State on 
independence. This background together with its commitment to state 
intervention to offset or reverse past state/enterprise intervention has 
meant that SADCC has always dealt in political economy not simply 
technocratic economics. That became clearer from 1981 when RSA's direct 
economic and military attacks on SADCC's member states made inclusion of 
specific criticisms of and calls for support against RSA in the Annual 
Conference Communique and added specific evaluation of vulnerability 
reduction and ways of reducing the impact of RSA's sanctions against the 
Southern African region (and how external sanctions against apartheid 
would affect them) to SADCC's programming. Direct responses to and 
analyses of economic and other defence against RSA thus became far more 
central than expected over 1979-80.
9. SADCC has no aims for geographic expansion as such. The accession of 
Namibia on independence and exploration of a special relationship (not 
necessarily simple membership) with post-apartheid South Africa are seen 
as consolidating the Southern African regional membership. This has 
turned on three beliefs:
a. too many states would reduce the closeness of links, increase 
problems of reaching consensus and create a lowest versus highest 
common denominator way of resolving non-identical positions;
b. including states either not really affected by RSA or not sharing 
SADCC’s negative perception of close economic relations with the 
apartheid state/economy would lead to serious conflicts within the 
organisation and increase risks of outside manipulation by RSA or its 
f riends;
c. SADCC has perceived itself as a sub-regional organisation which would 
(as envisaged in the Lagos Declaration) be a building block toward 
continental African economic integration together with other 
sub-regional organisations.
10. Nor does SADCC aim at exclusive membership of economic cooperation 
groups, i.e. it views the corridor transport groups of states in Eastern 
Africa, the Kagera Basin Authority (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania) 
and the Preferential Trade area of Eastern and Central Africa as actual 
or potential useful complements in building up a dense network of 
economic coordination/integration from Lesotho through the Sudan 
(eligible to accede to PTA albeit not now a member). This perception is 
not unrelated to a focus other than common market trade promotion.
11. Three procedural aims are substantive in their results to deserve mention 
together with the more directly substantive ones:
a. commitment to dialogue leading to a genuine, highest common
denominator sectoral programme (or response to a problem) even at the 
cost of delay to ensure that decisions once taken can and will be
acted upon; and therefore
b. priority to deep government involvement in all aspects from proposals
through dialogue and decision to concrete implementation together
with allocation of specific duties to each government to ensure SADCC
5and its programme are understood and viewed by member States as 
theirs rather than belonging to the organisation or its secretariat; 
plus
c. viewing relatively prompt, continuing, concrete gains to all member 
States as essential to sustaining member State priority commitment to 
coordinated action.
12. It is evident from this exposition of aims that SADCC is a highly 
unconventional economic integration organisation. Its focus on 
coordinated production (not trade as an end in itself) and its contextual 
choice of priority sectors have little in common either with older 
colonial/immediate post-colonial Common Markets or the newer Communities 
modelled on the EEC Treaty in form and amounting to preferential trade 
areas with at least nominal goals in other sectors added rather like 
decorations on a Christmas tree. Similarly the coordination approach 
involving hands on state intervention as a central means and state 
involvement at all stages is quite unlike common markets which tend to be 
more laissez faire in approach and to have strong central secretariats 
often overshadowing and appearing to dominate member State participants. 
The fast concrete results aim is a political/pragmatic one and one the 
newer economic communities tend to have given low attention with a danger 
of erosion of government priority and support before the tactics pursued 
could reasonably be expected to yield results.
II.
The Origins of SADCC
13- SADCC's origins lie in the history of cooperation among Eastern and 
Southern African Liberation Movements with each other and after some 
states (initially Tanzania) became independent with and among states as 
well. On the economic side the Zambia/Tanzania coordinated programme 
(notably in transport) after 1965 was a forerunner at bilateral level.
14. Institutionally the parent of SADCC was the Front Line States whose 
foreign ministers in early 1979 called for the meetings of economic
6officials and ministers which led to the first draft of the Lusaka 
Declaration to be and to the 1979 pre-SADCC Conference with external 
cooperating partners. In April 1980 (after Zimbabwe was on the verge of 
independence and the 3 independent non-FLS states had been recruited) it 
was formed at Heads of State and/or Government level.
15. Before 1979 what was to be SADCC was a concept with changing goals and 
sponsors. Initially several African and non-African functionaries and 
academicians sought to float a one-off aid coordination conference based 
on African side documentation and agenda and co-sponsored by EEC and ECA. 
When ECA withdrew its provisional support, the individuals reassessed 
work done and decided:
a. a regional coordination instrumentality suited to the Southern 
African context on a permanent basis and with internal regional 
development goals was more relevant to South African needs than a 
one-off aid coordination;
b. the appropriate sponsors were ultimately the FLS possibly with 
interim sponsorship/hosting by one or two FLS Heads of State 
(President Seretse Khama formally invited the participants to the 
1979 Arusha pre-SADCC and 1980 Lusaka Founding Conferences).
16. While the initial background materials were prepared by the old committee 
of individuals which was transformed into a SADCC London High 
Commissioner Committee with co-opted individuals (phased out in 1986/7), 
the decisions were taken and the draft of what was to be the Lusaka 
Declaration largely prepared by the FLS senior economic officials and 
then considered, amended and adopted by their Ministers. The two major 
changes as a result of the Arusha Conference with potential external 
partners were:
a. inclusion of food security (agricultural research and livestock were 
already there) as a priority programme area; and
b. concentration on coordinated mobilisation of funds to be chanelled 
direct to member States not via a SADCC development bank because it




17. The apex of SADCC's organisational structure is the annual Summit of 
Heads of State and/or Governments (6 to 8 of the 9 usually attend in 
person with the others represented by senior ministers). This is the 
final decision taking body in SADCC acting on key decisions and the 
Annual Report on the recommendation (as made or as modified) of the 
Council of Ministers and resolving disagreements not bridged at lower 
levels.
18. The Chairman of the Summit is elected by it and has been throughout the 
President of Botswana. This means that the Chairmanship of the Council 
of Ministers (Vice President and Finance Minister) and of the Standing 
Committee of Officials (Senior Official) are also held by Botswana.
19. The Summit - like all SADCC decision making bodies - operates on 
consensus. However, it seeks to achieve a highest possible (not lowest) 
common denominator agreement and to postpone a decision until a consensus 
adequate for such a decision arises rather than agreeing on a 
substanceless platitude or a declaration trying to paper over real 
disagreements with words. The rationale is that it is necessary to move 
forward (thus highest common denominator) and that this can only be done 
by substantive decisions which all or most member States will act upon.
20. The Council of Ministers meets twice a year - once before the Summit and 
once before the Annual Conference. It is the main programme and policy 
determining body albeit on perhaps two-thirds of its work it accepts the 
recommendations of its Standing Committee of Officials more or less 
unaltered.
821. The Standing Committee of Officials - usually with delegations led by a 
Permanent Secretary plus 3 to 5 specialist officials from sectoral 
ministries receives reports on programme and internal operations, 
proposals from member States, the Secretariat and the sectoral 
committees/sub-committees as well as commissioned studies; deliberates 
upon them and makes recommendations to the Council of Ministers.
22. Each sector - except transport which has a treaty based Southern African 
Trade and Transport Commission with a Ministerial Council and Official 
Committee chaired by Mozambique, has a Ministerial 
Committee/Sub-Committee and a parallel official level one analogous at 
sectoral level to the Council and Standing Committee. In addition there 
is a multi-sector Agricultural Committee of Ministers and supporting 
Committee of Officials to coordinate the work of the food and agriculture 
sectors. Most of the official level committees meet twice a year and the 
ministerial once.
23- The central Secretariat based in Gaborone is small albeit it is now
approaching 10 professionals. It is at present headed by a former 
Zimbabwean Minister. For several years there was no full time 
secretariat with two senior Botswana acting part time supported by 
several part time consultants mobilised largely by the London Committee 
of High Commissioners.
24. The Secretariat services all meetings including securing and/or preparing 
documentation. It has the power to undertake studies and to make 
proposals as well as to supervise consultancy (often regional experts) 
and topical (e.g. Regional Economic Survey) studies assigned to it by the 
Council of Ministers to whom it is responsible via the Standing Committee 
of Officials.
25. The Secretariat also carries out analyses of SADCC (and partner) 
strengths and weaknesses - by collecting information from partners as 
well as member States. It has important public relations and diplomatic 
roles as well as liaison with and coordination among (member) governments 
and especially sectoral coordinating units.
926. Programme development for each sector is the responsibility of one 
country. Each has a coordinating unit headed by a national professional 
and backed by 3 to over 20 citizen and expatriate professionals. The 
total of professionals in sectoral units (including certain Food Security 
projects and SACCAR - South African Council for the Coordination of 
Agricultural Research) is now about 100. The sectoral assignments are:
Angola - Energy
Botswana - Agricultural research/SACCAR; livestock production, 
and animal disease control 
Lesotho - Soil and water conservation and land utilisation;
tourism
Malawi - Fisheries, wildlife and forestry
Mozambique - Transport and communications (SATCC)
Swaziland - Manpower
Tanzania - Industry (manufacturing); trade
Zambia - Mining
Zimbabwe - Food security; multi sector agricultural
coordinating.
27. Coordinating units have sectoral responsibilities analogous to those of 
the Secretariat for SADCC as a whole plus a duty to secure proposals and 
conduct (or commission) studies to allow officials and ministers to 
formulate and agree a sectoral programme including policy coordination 
and substantive meetings as well as an agreed regional priority list of 
projects for submission to the Annual Conference and/or sectoral 
Conferences with cooperating partners (governments, international 
institutions, enterprises). They also prepare sectoral reviews and 
project submissions for the Annual Conference and in some cases assist 
member States with project formulation and external funding negotiations.
28. Almost all SADCC priority projects (about half of those submitted reach 
the agreed lists) are implemented by the directly affected state or 
states. Finance is channelled to them not via SADCC. This is not a hard 
and fast rule, e.g. some food security projects are run via that sector's 
coordinating unit and the regional hydrocarbon middle level personpower 
training institute is run via the energy sector coordinating unit.
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29. The Annual Conference with invited guests (cooperating partners plus the 
Namibian and South African Liberation Movements) is a formal part of the 
institutional structure. The 1989 one in Luanda will be the 10th 
counting the 1979 conference and will mark each Member State’s having 
hosted it once. The Conference is a forum for presentation of proposals 
to and dialogue with cooperating partners (almost all of the 50 odd 
present address it) as well as for sectoral and corridor bilateral 
meetings, a Conference communique and special pre-conference meetings now 
normally including one with domestic and external enterprise 
representatives. The conference is backed by detailed documentation 
both sectoral and overall.
30. The SADCC Annual Conference is the only ’Consultative Group’ of resource 
providers convened by and relating to an agenda drawn up by the Southern 
side. As such it is important especially given the number of delegations 
and the high level of representation (e.g. EEC Commissioner; World Bank 
Vice President; several ministers and aid agency heads). It provides 
both a forum for support for and pledges to SADCC and a way of 
maintaining high level contact and a relatively high profile. However, 
it is no longer a major forum for negotiating on specific projects while 
SADCC policy is (and has always been) decided at the Summit and Council 
of Ministers meetings not the Annual Conference.
31. SADCC has two major inter-institutional agreements:
a. with the Nordic Council on intra-sectoral cooperation broader than 
the traditional aid relationship;
b. with the EEC to designate SADCC as the body to agree allocation of 
EEC Southern African Regional funding from EDF and to set out 
substantive and procedural guidelines.
32. In a formal sense SADCC lacks a constitution. It has:
a. the Lusaka Declaration adopted by Heads of State and/or Government 
which sets out aims overall and for main sectors and broadly outlines 
approaches to coordination;
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b. an agreed memorandum on institutional and organisational procedures.
In practice the precise legal status of the Declaration (at least one 
member State sees it as a Treaty, most do not) and memorandum are of
little significance. The Declaration is lucid, intelligible, relevant 
and has both served as a strategic frame and been honoured and acted on 
by the member States rather to much more than the more formal 
constitutions of other regional organisations. The memorandum codifies 
the institutional structure adequately. If SADCC were to receive large 
sums of finance for projects and/or loan finance a new document would be 
needed but probably a financial body reporting to the Council of 
Ministers via the Standing Committee of Officials not a formal 
constitution for SADCC as such.
33. SADCC's institutional structure is quite deliberately crafted to relate
directly to its aims. Therefore, it is not that of a conventional
regional integration grouping. The central Secretariat is small and the 
sectoral ones are located in each member state under that State's 
coordination. There is very substantial participation in programme and 
project preparation, dialogue amendment and adoption (or rejection) by 
member States at sectoral and overall levels (official, ministerial and 
in key or disagreed cases Summit). The central Secretariat and Sectoral 
Coordinating units are influential but far less auto-directed or dominant 
than most regional secretariats. SADCC - quite deliberately at the 
present stage - makes no claims whatsover to supranationality. Equally 
it has for several years resisted adding new sectors because most were 
seen as either not directly related to its aims, not requiring 
coordinated action or equally effectively coordinated through other 
(specialist) regional channels.
34. SADCC, to date, has no formal links with regional non-governmental bodies
- e.g. enterprise (Chambers of Commerce), trade unions, commercial banks
- set up for the SADCC region nor with external ngo's. However, it 
encourages such initiatives, sends representatives to major meetings and 
may agree on a more formal set of links over the next few years.
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IV.
SADCC's Applied Strategic Model: Perceived Cumulative Mutual Interest
35. SADCC's political economic integration (or coordination) strategy is at 
one level very little discussed overtly but at another it is central to 
the debates about vision, structural/institutional nature and 
dependence/co-optation. SADCC has stated its strategic aims and its 
approach to reaching them rather more lucidly and contextually than most 
public sector actors and its record (both as to successes and - usually 
openly stated by SADCC - problems) suggests that these are real 
operational aims and approaches. What it has not done is to formulate a 
precise theoretical or intellectual model, partly because it doubts it 
has any comparative advantage there; partly because agreement in and 
commitment to medium term action and perspectives based on somewhat 
different histories and political visions could be broken by trying to 
agree on a common long term theoretical and ideological vision within 
SADCC; partly because not giving too many forewarnings to external 
enemies (notably RSA) nor too many non-programmatic points with which 
cooperating partners might disagree seems prudent.
36. SADCC's implicit and/or revealed preference strategic model has the 
following characteristics as seen by proponents (and a rather different 
counter set as seen by critics):
a. multinational mutual interest (narrow nationalist alliances of 
convenience);
b. regional self-reliance/self-definition (dependence shifting and 
maximising);
c. priority to circuit of production/sub-circuit of transport (fudging 
on trade liberalisation);
d. pragmatic sequential or contextual critical path (mindless crisis 
coping).
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37* These may be - indeed probably are - different perceptions of the same 
body of principles and praxis. It is desirable to make two preliminary 
caveats before examining the features in more detail:
a. because SADCC is either contextual and pragmatic critical path 
oriented (or context bound and short term crisis patching oriented) 
statements and actions at any time and especially over time will not 
and cannot add up to a tidy, monolithic unity;
b. there are three main bodies of critics - idealist new 
left/conservative Marxist, technocratic, pragmatic capitalist/neo 
liberal - each subdivided internally so that modelling criticism as 
if it were unified is slightly artificial. Curiously, however, there 
is a remarkable overlap of specific observations even when the 
aims/ideologies of the critics diverge and their judgements on the 
desirability of an element in SADCC's approach diverge.
38. Multinational mutual interest promotion has been perceived by SADCC's 
member States and officials as the only practicable basis for aim 
definition, programme design, resource mobilisation and implementation. 
The historic record and the political decision takers' perceptions of 
their own contexts (and preferences) indicate that there is at present no 
base for supranational institutions and that supposed supranational 
(secretariat/technocrat) strategy and programme definition for 
nationalist (state) implementation leads either to inaction or to 
contradictions both among the states and between them and the regional 
organisation.
39. This approach explains the pattern of exploring suggested areas of mutual 
interest to see whether and how they could give rise to effective (real 
gains if done, real technical-financial-political base for doing) action 
and then mandating that a programme of action be built up and put into 
operation. The case is not one of abstract optimality nor of tidiness 
but of viability.
40. The criticism that such an approach cannot overcome nationalist 
differences and interests in specific cases (e.g. Zimbabwe coal powered 
national electricity versus cheaper regional hydro power imports) nor
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transcend them more generally (e.g. Zimbabwe power imports repaid by 
Zimbabwe manufactured foods or grain exports on a ’’second best" 
comparative advantage basis) is a serious one. It is perfectly possible 
for such a pattern of failure to build up and to marginalise regional 
coordination so that it shrivels rather than growing into de facto 
indicative policy/planning integration.
41. But ’the answer' must ultimately be empirical. Are there results and is 
the trend toward broader integration of multinational concerns/joint 
gains into national planning - decision taking - acting? Or the reverse? 
In the energy sector the direction of movement is toward multinational 
coordination and a unified grid for 6 or 7 states (Angola - Botswana - 
Zimbabwe - Zambia - Mozambique - Swaziland - perhaps Namibia) with 
coordinated decisions on future sources of power and intertrade. When 
the sectoral unit began its work the idea that such a schema could win 
serious attention from several of the states concerned would have been 
(and quite correctly) derided. The problematic question is whether this 
consensus for mutual interest approaches can move fast enough to get its 
facts (dams, regional transmission lines) on the ground before the 
narrower national/enterprise interest proponents build their facts (coal 
fired plants and national/unlinked grids). The answer remains to be seen 
but SADCC does have a strategic approach which at least in this case is 
gaining ground whereas a 1981 proposal for a regional grid using Angolan, 
Zambian and Mozambican sources to feed Zimbabwe and Botswana would have 
had lukewarm political backing outside Zambia and vehement 
politico-economic-security opposition from the two proposed importers.
42. Regional self-reliance/self-definition is central to SADCC's strategy. 
The strategy is sequential in two senses:
a. reducing dependence on RSA comes first and in that process 
transport/communication (for objective reasons) must be the main 
initial focus;
b. self-respect and self-definition of aims and approaches are an 
essential first step toward self-reliance and are attainable whereas
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at the present time financial dependence is an inescapable fact which 
can be diversified and/or marginally reduced but not eliminated.
43. The RSA priority and within it the transport/communications priority have
already been discussed. They do account for a very high proportion of
decisions, time spent, policies formulated, projects agreed on and 
implementation achieved. In communications they have virtually ended 
dependence on RSA in respect to telecommunications and (with one 
exception) posts. In air service they have created the possibility of 
operating wholly independently of RSA and the reality of more direct 
intra-regional and overseas connections. In ground transport they (plus 
related FLS/national military action) are within reach of making use of 
RSA routes for third country trade not merely unnecessary but more 
expensive than regional ones. (There is a caveat here - RSA direct
military action can interdict the Mozambican and Angolan lines even if
its proxy forces’ ability to do so is rapidly waning.)
44. The reverse side of the RSA/transport priorities is acceptance of 
diversifying dependence for finance and trade to countries willing to
assist in financing regional infrastructure and eager to pick up
previously RSA sources and markets. SADCC's member States (rightly or 
wrongly) prefer diversified European-North American-International 
Financial Institution actual (plus CMEA member and less poor South
potential) dependence to concentrated dependence on the apartheid state, 
economy and transport system. Interdependence with these actors is a
longer term goal but one thought to be facilitated by diversified, 
flexible (rather than concentrated, rigid) dependence.
45. SADCC is noticeably touchy in respect to outside attempts to write its 
basic documents and communiques, to specify monistic policy approaches, 
to tell it what the ideal political economy for Southern Africa is, to 
use finance to sanction particular SADCC member States or to substitute 
their own project proposals for SADCC’s. It places a very high premium 
on self-definition and self-respect. Willingness to enter into dialogue 
on almost anything (and to word results to save face all round) is 
matched by a fairly stubborn and steely refusal to accept outside 
redefinition or teleguiding.
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46. SADCC does not see these priorities as 'flag regionalism' but as a means 
to salvage some independence/inter-dependence now and to lay the 
technico-intellectual basis for extending it when physical-financial 
resource dependence can be reduced significantly (which at present it 
perceives to be impossible). On the whole it has kept control of aim 
evaluation, programme design, project prioritisation, conference 
procedure in SADCC hands. And - interestingly - externally financed 
implementation is in percentage terms distributed relatively similarly to 
SADCC proposals even if at substantially lower levels overall and in each 
sector.
47. SADCC's concentration on production coordination first, with trade 
expansion coordination a consequential subsequent stage, is partly based 
on analysis and partly on a perception of historic problems and present 
potentials. It is quite plainly visible in the Lusaka Declaration in 
which trade receives serious attention but in a third tier of sectors 
following both transport and communication and food security. There is a 
sense in which it is the result of the coming together of three elements:
a. practising politicians' perception that employment, production of 
goods and services, infrastructure and rural incomes were concrete 
priorities while trade was one of a number of means to achieving 
them;
b. an analytical perception that the static or incremental comparative 
static allocational efficiency case for common markets simply did not 
fit the Southern African context and that the economic performance 
and sustainability record of free trade or preferential trade areas 
in Sub-Saharan Africa was dismal because of production and 
infrastructure gaps as well as because of distributional and 
intraregional jealously problems;
c. an overlapping historic perception that most SADCC member States had 
been ill-served by the Central African Common Market, East African 
Common Market, Southern African Customs Union and 'Portugal in 
Africa' Common Market arrangements so that that route as the core of 
a "new start" regionalism would have to carry real political and
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psychological burdens and would increase distrust of the stronger 
economies (notably Zimbabwe).
48. Transport and communication of course does generate as well as enabling 
trade. However, it - like energy for which coordinated regional 
development and grid links automatically lead to trade - is not actually 
perceived as involving trade because what is connoted by that term in 
economic regionalism is goods and especially manufactured goods.
49. It was therefore not surprising that the first post Lusaka trade dialogue 
arose in the manufacturing (industry) sector. This took the form of 
seeking to identify potential cross sourcing of inputs and final 
manufactured goods regionally to increase use of excess capacity (or 
new/projected enterprises) and to reduce regional import content and 
national hard currency requirements. The other theme was that duties 
were not the main barriers to regional intertrade which were perceived as 
inadequate information, transportation and preferential licensing plus - 
potentially at least - lack of export credit availability.
50. Subsequent movement toward creating and activating the trade sector have 
been largely within that optic. The reasons both for that approach and 
for its slowness are four-fold:
a. trade validates production rather than causing it in SADCC's view of 
its own context;
b. a complementary duty reduction and routine clearing house body which 
all SADCC states could join (to date 7 have - not Angola and 
Botswana) existed in the PTA and duplication made little if any 
economic and less than no political sense;
c. blank hard currency cheque writing (free trade and freedom from 
import licensing) was totally impracticable for eight of SADCC's nine 
member States whereas two way semi-balanced trade expansion was seen 
as desirable by all;
d. working out a programme based on "a" and "c" and demonstrably 
avoiding serious real or potential clashes with the PTA proved
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technically and politically tedious for varied (some internal to 
particular SADCC States) reasons.
51. The criticism for not centring on free (from tariffs, import licenses and 
payment restriction) trade via preferential trade are logial from 
political or economic advocates of economic liberalism including 
businessmen. The oddity is that the majority have come from 
interventionists of the centre to far left whose advocacy of laissez 
faire in regional trade and an imported (EEC-Andean Pact based) 
institutional form/analytical model approach to economic regionalism 
consort oddly with their general anti-dependency, articulated planning, 
state controlled production and trade paradigm.
52. The argument that the historic record in the South shows effective trade 
development takes a long time has been heard in different ways by critics 
than by SADCC. The latter believed:
a. other sectors had to be sequenced earlier to have concrete benefits 
to show while the more intractable problems of the trade sector were 
tackled over a longer period;
b. progress in the other sectors would create physical, informational 
and psychological contexts in which trade would be more handleable 
and potential gains more widely seen and sought.
This perception may be wrong, but it is a sequential strategic 
formulation, somewhat ironically (as no SADCC decision taker or analyst 
formulated it in those terms) directly paralleling the Marxian 
formulation of the circuits of production (to create surplus) and of 
exchange (to validate the production and surplus).
53. Sequential programming related to physical and moving contextual factors 
has been central to SADCC's operational strategy and operations from the 
1979-80 founding meetings. For example, rebuilt regional transport was 
seen as a necessary condition for dependence reduction, for regional food 
security utilising national surpluses to meet national deficits (or for 
getting overseas food aid to where it was needed) and for making regional
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intertrade physically as well as economically practicable. As a result, 
that sector not only has received the highest priority in project 
formulation and fund raising/utilising throughout but at the 1980 Maputo 
Annual Conference was the only sector for which a relatively complete, 
articulated programme (subsequently elaborated, refined and extended to 
posts and to meteorology rather than structurally redesigned) was 
presented.
54. The subsequent addition of new sectoral and issue (cooperation with 
enterprises, going beyond aid with the Nordic partners, creating a 
capacity to coordinate use of EEC's Southern African EDF regional fund, 
seeking regional trade facilitating financing, starting toward 
coordinated regional economic analysis as a step to coordinated 
indicative planning) has rested on perceptions of timely initiatives 
whose "time had come". This is partly by design - in each case thinking 
and preparation preceded public emphasis by one to four years, albeit 
chance (e.g. sectoral country capacity to coordinate a programme) played 
a role as well so that any claim of formal, explicit critical path 
projection would be rather overblown.
55. The 'random walk' or crisis response criticism perceives the actual 
pattern as totally reactive and in particular as responding to unforeseen 
crises and unexpected chances to grab short term gains. This appears 
even less plausible an interpretation than a perfect critical path one. 
The transport, food security/agriculture, manufacturing, mining, trade 
themes emerge in the Lusaka Declaration and relatively systematical 
subsequent work buildup not just in new Annual Conference themes. Work 
had usually been begun well prior to high publicity 'launching' of a new 
priority or phase. The Nordic and EEC initiatives required external 
contexts receptive to them before SADCC could move. Barring perfect 
foresight any rational organisation does blend underlying strategy with 
emphases on what is sequentially possible/necessary in particular 
temporal contexts.
56. The most disputed sequence: transportation and communication, food 
security, production, trade has already been noted and discussed. An 
overlapping but more general one has been acting on areas of agreed, 
primary common interests (plus relevant secondary common interests of
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special concern to two or more member States) to build up both a record 
of results and a habit of "thinking SADCC" based on direct contact among 
widening bodies of officials, analysts, enterprises and politicians. 
These were and are seen as leading to broadening perceptions of mutual 
interest and safer dialogue/negotiation on how to pursue mutual interest 
elements in 'difficult' sectors or sub-sectors in which there are 
tensions or secondary contradictions among member States as well as 
common interests attainable only through coordinated action.
57* Several aspects of SADCC's approach to regional coordination/integration 
are strategic but do not fit into any particular strategic model of 
development. These include:
a. an emphasis on rehabilitation and maintenance;
b. seeking genuinely selective priority project lists (not 'washing' or 
'Buggins turn' accumulations of unconsidered national suggestions);
c. high priority to applied agricultural research with an explicit bias 
toward crops and techniques of special interest to poor/small 
peasants;
d. a view of manpower development increasingly integrated with sectoral 
programmes;
e. melding policy development and coordination (e.g. airline scheduling) 
with project list development;
f. movement toward indicative planning coordination as a framework for 
advancing coordination sectorally and more generally;
g. insistence on keeping the agenda and context of external resource 
mobilisation in its own hands and of repelling attempts to use 
assistance to divide SADCC member States or to co-opt the Programme 
of Action;
h. combined with a pragmatic willingness to consider cooperation 
proposals case by case on their probable concrete results even when
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they were parts of general external country approaches SADCC's member 
States did not welcome (e.g. the positive reaction to USA support for
Tazara and Mozambican transport link rehabilitation and of British
for general rehabilitation/protection of the Mozambican transport and 
other sectors despite the very different USA position on Angola and 
the UK's overt posing of SADCC - and especially Mozambique - support 
as, in its mind, an alternative to sanctions against apartheid and/or 
South African regional aggression);
i. an overt perception of partially overlapping regional economic
cooperation/integration organisations as potentially complementary 
and (on comparative advantage, division of labour grounds) efficient 
not inherently divisive and wasteful.
58. SADCC's 1980 and subsequent SATCC programmes have - in respect to
railways and ports - been primarily rehabilitation and deferred
maintenance (including but not limited to reversing the effects of South 
Africa directed sabotage). The initial and recent focus of the 
industrial sector has been on capacity restoration and utilisation (and 
avoiding building new surplus capacity). Maintenance facilities and 
training of maintenance personnel figure prominently in several sectors. 
This is fashionable today but it was not before 1983 and in 1980 when 
SADCC, and especially SATCC, set these priorities it was very atypical 
indeed. So much so in fact that SADCC took care to present all 
rehabilitation proposals in the form of standard projects because, at 
that time, they would otherwise have been unsaleable.
59. By and large only half of initial proposals reach SADCC's coordinated, 
regional priority project lists. It is accepted that to be taken 
seriously SADCC lists must have coherence, priorities and defensible 
rationales. Thus it has been possible to select, to prioritise and to 
sequence - e.g. the successive conferences presenting and mobilising 
funds toward indicative ten and definite three year plans for each of the 
major landlocked states to SADCC ports corridors. True, states with very 
few potential projects do have more relaxed evaluation of the regional 
impact (not the viability) of their proposals but, unlike the old East 
African Community, for example, which operated on "buggins turn" 
principles in most sectors, SADCC's criteria of regional (2 or more
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country) impact, viability and relevance to overall goals have been 
operational.
60. The Lusaka Declaration is unique among economic integration consitiutions
in giving prominence to a specific agricultural research initiative
oriented to semi-arid lands and poor farmers. It took five years to get 
this off the ground (or perhaps more aptly into the ground) but that was 
because initially international crop research institutions and most 
funders did not want to know. SADCC (and particularly Botswana and 
Zimbabwe) kept plugging away with major national-regional-international 
linked millet, sorghum, groundnut and grain legume research nets plus 
SACCAR and regular technical meetings now established facts of regional 
life. The crops and conditions chosen make the programme small peasant 
output and income oriented (not to the taste of some of the technocrats 
and funders who would prefer a more monistic gross output focus).
61. Manpower development is an early SADCC sector. It has developed regional
use of several specialised facilities: e.g. farm management in Swaziland,
veterinary in Zimbabwe, the Eastern and Southern African Management
Institute in Arusha, the hydrocarbon personnel institute in Angola as 
well as publishing a directory of specialised institutions in member 
States to enhance decentralised regional placement where practicable. In 
addition sectoral - Manpower Unit cooperation on training projects or 
policies has become common with particular reference to transport and 
communication, forestry, mining and industry. There has been a 
contextual pragmatism as to form: multicountry use, cash sharing among 
users and outside funders and user input into programme design and 
evaluation have been the operating criteria for selection and design not 
creation of new, autonomous, multistate training institutions.
62. SADCC's initial programme was project focussed but projects to implement 
goals. Policy coordination - e.g. airline scheduling, forestry-fuel 
interactions, agricultural research, trans-border livestock disease 
control - came later but is now a substantial portion of the activities 
of several sectors. This is in itself evidence that SADCC has gone far 
beyond being a packaging plant for project requests to external financial 
sources.
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63. Indicative planning coordination - sectorally (e.g. industry), on key 
topics (e.g. response to South African economic sanctions) and more 
tentatively intra-sectorally (building from the regional economic 
surveys) is a strategic goal in SADCC. Progress toward it has been 
incremental, cautious and - arguably - slow. The reasons are complex 
(e.g. weaknesses at technical level in the industry sector, refocussing 
of attention to withstand sharply increased 1981-86 RSA assaults on key 
transport corridors and - above all - the need to build up habits of 
cooperation and belief coordination paid before pressing further 
forward). In fact for major transport projects SATCC is a de facto 
regional indicative planning process because large projects unable to be 
agreed into its priority list are, objectively, unlikely to secure 
adequate external finance.
64. The unique nature of SADCC's Annual Conference - an external support 
consultative group set up, staffed and programmed by the South side - has 
already been cited. SADCC has sought to increase the scope to include 
potential Northeastern (CMEA) and less poor Southern sources of finance 
and also major Southern economies who could contribute to dialogue and 
policy cooperation even if not to finance. The attempt to broaden 
financial sources may now be succeeding but, despite very persistent 
recruitment efforts, the CMEA states have not chosen to use the SADCC 
channels for much of their (limited) economic project support funding. 
The recruitment of other Southern voices and non-financial partners has 
been more successful.
65. SADCC has declined 'aid' for projects not on its agenda. The same holds 
true of 'aid' whose designation as not to benefit some members was 
perceived as manipulative in intent and was certainly potentially 
divisive. In the event unity on renegotiating and/or refinancing (both 
largely successful) as well as on a sharply worded Summit statement were 
achieved. Positive selectivity has been accepted as a fact of life, e.g. 
Portuguese concentration on Angolan and Mozambican projects, USAID 
focussing (at least over 1986-88) on the Indian Ocean transport corridors 
and on Mozambique and Tanzania (ironically on its earlier attempted 
'exclusion from benefit' list!) as countries within that focus. 
Analogously UK support for Mozambique has been welcomed despite the UK's 
(not SADCC's) presentation of such aid as an alternative to sanctions
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against South Africa. In these cases SADCC's criteria have turned on 
whether the funds can be used to further SADCC goals, whether rejecting 
them would actually change the other policies of the funder and the
impact of rejection/acceptance on intra SADCC solidarity.
66. In a negative sense SADCC's regional integration strategy is said to be
characterised by the absence of a political economic project. This is of
course not wholly correct; the basic aims are nothing if not political 
economic. But what is usually meant is that SADCC does not endorse 
"transition to socialism" nor "transition to laissez faire with a 
nightwatchman state" (and has brusquely and publicly rejected advice to 
adopt the latter when proffered at Annual Conferences).
67. The short answer is that there is no basis for such an endorsement.
There is no way in which Angola and Lesotho or Mozambique and Botswana or 
Tanzania and Malawi could agree on a full-fledged political economy 
project beyond ambiguous rhetoric (and probably not even that). To 
attempt to do so would be a waste of time and a source of friction not - 
for the foreseeable future - a way to strengthen economic regionalism. 
What can be agreed is not minor in political economic terms:
a. dependence reduction especially vis a vis RSA;
b. increased regional self-definition of goals and influence over 
external negotiations to mobilise support (including finance) for 
them;
c. priority for food security, poor peasant production and the welfare 
of poor majorities;
d. regional production coordination as a means to increasing regional 
self-reliance and to raising regional and national external economic 
bargaining power;
e. centrality of selective state intervention backed by substantial 
freedom of manoeuvre for enterprises (public and private; domestic 
joint venture or foreign).
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V.
SADCC: A Review of Results
68. SADCC must be judged in its own terms - its goals and criteria. That is 
not an easy test as dependence, especially on South Africa, reduction; 
building viable regionalism and mobilising the domestic and external 
support and resources to do so are not soft targets. The added criterion 
of concrete results on the ground within a few years is in some respects 
even stiffer. SADCC does reflect on and measure itself against those 
yardsticks. Quantitatively the best tests are probably agreed projects, 
funding secured and implementation achieved. By the end of 1988 the 
SADCC priority project lists were about 600 with total funds required 
with total financing required of the order of $7,500 million (up from 
totals of about 200 and - inflation adjusted - $3,000 million in 1980). 
Of this total 61% related to transport and communications. By the same 
date at somewhat over $2,700 had been definitively committed to specific 
projects and over $800 million was in some stage of negotiation (or was 
in fact earmarked domestically if the complementary foreign resources 
were negotiated). That is a total of nearly 50% definitely available or 
under serious negotiation. A significant number of capital as well as 
study projects had been completed and over $1,000 million invested in 
completed and ongoing projects. The last figure is about 15% of targets 
and 30% of funding secured. These figures do show lags but more against 
present targets than the initial (and viewed as optimistic) ceiling of 
$2,000 million (say $3,000 million at current prices) raisable over 10 
years envisaged in 1979-80. Present flows seem to be of the order of 
$1,000 million a year in ’general1 commitments (with some double counting 
of multi-year and repeated amounts), $750 million negotiated to specific 
project use and $400 million in annual investment. Again the lag problem 
exists (partly because the growth of the programme which means investment 
relates to earlier smaller commitments and negotiated amounts) and is 
receiving attention. But that does not detract from the clear fact that 
SADCC has agreed on, funded a substantial proportion of and made a major 
start on building an impressive array of regional projects. The concrete 
facts are and are increasingly visible both in financial flows and on the 
ground.
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6 9. The quality of the achieved programme in terms of its relevance to 
SADCC's aims is high. 70$ of funds definitely committed at the middle of 
1988 were for Transport and Communication which accounted for 40$ of 
funding sought. Excluding the Lobito Bay Corridor which RSA has 
(directly and via its UNITA proxy) blocked throughout the past decade 
(but may no longer be able to block by the end of 1989) the funding for 
Transport and Communication is of the order of 50$ - admittedly a
lower success ratio in transport and higher in communications but 
including substantial progress on all the Indian Ocean Port Corridors and 
completion of the most crucial communication links. SADCC’s annual 
corridor of concentration conference series now turns to Lobito Bay 
precisely at the moment when a real chance of providing security for the 
line has emerged. The Agricultural Sector - notably in respect to the 
agricultural research, animal disease control and the early warning
system - has made substantial progress in key areas. Given the prior
need to create a regional outlook among previously very nationalistically 
oriented ministries, the same can be said in power. Industry has not put 
many factories on the ground but it has created a framework for viewing 
regional industrialisation, a clear focus on rehabilitation and capacity 
utilisation and a very real gain in providing the data base on which a 
number of duplicatory or otherwise non-viable projects have been shelved. 
Among the central sectors trade has lagged. Here SADCC appears to have
reached near agreement and tentativve funding for linked export
promotion/credit programmes which could have significant impact well 
before 1995.
70. Dependence on RSA has been decreased, especially relative to what would 
have happened had there been no SADCC. No member State has been pushed 
into a South African ’co-prosperity sphere’. All who now use RSA routes 
are seeking to reduce the proportion of trade transitting RSA and except 
for Lesotho have concrete plans for how to do so. As was not the case 
in 1980, all have direct satellite telecommunication links with the 
outside world and direct air links with each other (some with transit 
stops but none necessarily transitting a South African airport. It is 
easy to say only 10$ of Zimbabwe’s external trade went through Mozambique 
in 1987. But that figure excludes petroleum and includes direct trade 
overland to neighbours. Excluding the latter and including the former 
alters the Mozambican transit share to about one-third. Further, by late
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1989 the useable capacity on the Beira and Maputo (Chicualacuala) 
corridors should be of the order of 80 to 100%. By the same time Zambia 
should be able to dispense with the costly East London route and Botswana 
will have begun using Mozambican routes seriously for the first time 
since 1975. Further, South Africa's now failed efforts to interdict the 
Indian Ocean routes have backfired - the routes from a low point in
1983-85 have clawed back, international support for them and their 
defence has soared, the danger and cost of not being able to use them has 
become brutally clear so that the commitment to them of Botswana, Malawi, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe is higher and firmer than it was in 1980-81.
71. Building a viable regionalism is clearly an area of progress. SADCC is 
now seen in the region (including its press and 
enterprise/union/church/non-governmental groups) as an important fact of 
life. Each state believes it can see concrete gains from its SADCC
membership (a result of the fast achievement of "facts on the ground"
stress within SADCC and of the distribution of sectoral coordinating
units to each member State). Thinking SADCC and personally knowing 
counterparts in other SADCC States may still be painfully uneven but in
1979-80 it did not exist at all regionally (at most there were a handful 
of bilateral cases plus empathy and political regionalism with limited 
economic articulation). Tensions over divisions of gains have been 
negligible. First, each member state has received something so that the 
precise balance has been a very secondary issue. Second, the more 
commitment and energy the more gains model has operated so clearly that 
desire for a bigger share has been channelled into expanding not reducing 
regional effort. Third, the corridor projects each benefits (or will 
benefit) two or more states substantially and - except for South Africa 
locked Lesotho - directly involve all SADCC member States.
72. Mobilising resources is an area in which results exceed expectations, lag 
needs and have been more externally dependent than expected. In the 
context of far greater South African violent reaction than anticipated 
(an underestimation of how hardline South African state security policy 
was to be and how vital it believed regional economic and transport 
dominance to be) and the radical worsening of the global economic 
environment confronting Southern Africa after 1980 that is a substantial 
achievement. SADCC was a new untested body and process, yet over 19 81-88
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it has been able to mobilise increasing amounts of member State senior 
decision takers' and officials' time - a very scarce resource indeed. 
Domestic finance was less available than expected - in a period of crisis 
and contraction large new finance and foreign exchange commitments out of 
own resources are unattainable. But member States have proved willing to 
prioritise scarce foreign support funding (some but not all additional) 
to SADCC coordinated programmes which demonstrates more commitment than 
is generally recognised. Similarly external cooperating partners have 
been willing to raise the amount of serious attention they devoted to and 
funds they allocated through the SADCC mechanisms while no such process 
was general in bilateral relation terms.
73. SADCC's presentation of its case and that of its member States has 
probably been crucial. It was and is an African body with clear goals, 
optimism tempered by grim realism, detailed proposals based on analysis 
and a record including successes. That was so unusual in SSA over
1980-88 as to attract international attention and support. Further, the 
steady drumbeat of practical, viable economic proposals with the 
counterpoint of steady, brutal South African attempts to destroy them and 
the people they served did more than raise money. It contributed to the 
shift of attitudes toward South Africa by the international economic 
community. SADCC has played a supporting role but a significant one in 
turning RSA into a high perceived risk, high "hassle factor", economic 
pariah in the eyes of most governments and enterprises. More directly 
SADCC clearly established itself as the victim seeking to survive not the 
aggressor so that funding (and by 1988 even de facto security assistance) 
for key dependence reducing projects began to flow more freely and not 
totally ineffective diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on RSA to 
halt its total regional onslaught. The most crucial case was Mozambique. 
Certainly Mozambique's own struggle including its brilliant, sustained 
diplomatic offensive was central. Certainly outside documents like the 
US State Department’s Gersoney Report and UNICEF's Children On The Front 
Line played significant roles. But so did SADCC - especially during the 
period before Mozambique joined the ACP and the World Bank. The firm 
warning that the death of the transport sector and economy of independent 
Mozambique would toll the knell for other states, the low key and 
documented but also passionate reporting of what RSA and its proxies were 
doing and (for a somewhat different audience) the continued firm support
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when the Nkomati Agreement was misread abroad were in the end much more 
than the shouting upwind in a gale they sometimes appeared over 
1982- 1 9 8 6.
74. Other regional economic integration bodies have been born, shot up 
briefly and withered in the heat of the African sun and the blasts of the 
international economic environment. The East African Community (a 
rousing success over 1967-70 but moribund 5 and dead 7 years later) leaps 
to mind. Is this likely to be SADCC's trajectory? Probably not:
a. the 1980-88 period has hurled a barrage of shocks at SADCC and its 
member States. It has not merely survived but been able to establish 
itself and move ahead despite them;
b. SADCC has more concrete new results on the ground than EAC ever did. 
A process of joint gains building up a new positive political glue to 
reinforce the still deeply adhesive initial factor of common 
dependence on and individual economic powerlessness in respect to the 
apartheid state and economy has begun;
c. the pace of achievement has been speeding up not slackening;
d. SADCC is well aware it must continue a forward dynamic consolidating
and building on areas of success and increasing their number to
survive and has demonstrated a healthy awareness of how hard it may 
be to achieve that.
75. SADCC has notably avoided the dangers of triumphalism and of premature 
resting on its laurels. Its Annual Reports and Conference Speeches do 
catalogue achievements and strengths but equally weaknesses, gaps and - 
especially - work still to be done. There is almost always a survey or
study in progress evaluating some aspect of SADCC's work with a view to
identifying weaknesses and areas for change as well as to ensure that 
what works is noted and continued. Innovation (cautious in areas of 
success, radical in areas of little progress) has been a hallmark of
SADCC. New sectors, approaches to enterprises increased emphasis on 
policy coordination, the Nordic and EEC Agreements, the campaign to make 
the economic costs of RSA aggression known - condemned internationally -
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partly clawed back in additional support could not have been predicted in 
1980. As to aims and basic structural approaches SADCC has been 
consistent. The Lusaka Declaration has proven to be a workable blueprint 
needing tidying up and adding to, not redrafting. On ways and means 
experience and context have been learned from and some changes are far 
more basic than they appear. Staffing is a clear example. Granted SADCC 
was always committed to careful documentation and to creating posts as 
and after necessary work for their occupants to do had been identified, 
10 Central Secretariat and over 100 Coordinating Unit and associated 
project professionals by 1988 was most emphatically not envisaged by a 
majority of SADCC member States in 1980-81. Nor was the total of 
diplomatic, coordinating, study promoting and sectoral backup work 
delegated to the Secretariat - the reason both for its enhanced status 
(still clearly as a servant of its member States but a more senior one - 
almost a joint Ministry shared by the 9) and its growing staff.
76. The definitive history of an institution or a process (SADCC is both) can 
be written only after they are dead. Their future can be projected with 
certainty only when they clearly have no future. Thus the prospects for 
SADCC are necessarily problematic. The record of achievement and the 
forward dynamic sketched above are real but so are the problems, 
capsulized in the following section.
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VI.
Problems and Problematics SADCC Confronts
77- SADCC's problems/problematics can be summed up under nine
heads:
a. continuing the momentum toward indicative coordinated 
planning;
b. broadening and deepening the habit of "thinking SADCC";
c. getting trade development moving;
d. reduction of external dependence in respect to technical 
personnel, institutional support and project finance;
e. improvement in the quality and quantity of work of certain 
sectoral units;
f. create more sense of urgency in resolving problems in 
respect to which timeous action is important and 
differences are bridgeable more by intensive dialogue than 
extensive passage of time;
g. resolution of the division of labour question with PTA;
h. the evolution of RSA's regional strategy;
i. the evolution of the international economic and weather 
context.
78. To pose this set of problems and problematics is to take the
positions that:
a. SADCC is to date a success;
b. the causes and conditions of that success remain relevant 
and provide a basis for future progress;
c. and that consolidation and incremental quality improvement 
rather than massive structural adjustment is appropriate 
(or evolution not revolution); but
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d. SADCC, like its member States, remains highly vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks and climates.
79- The buildup of successive de facto indicative plans by sector 
is to date promising. But only in transport and communication 
is the progress to date really to indicative planning (and even 
there key routes now defined as non-regional may need to be 
brought in for the planning to be fully effective). In energy 
the coordinated pieces are to date marginal and in industry at 
conceptual and identification of what not to do (valuable but 
limited as a building block) levels. The regional economic 
survey is neither frequent nor in depth enough to serve as a 
guide to national planners as to regional perspectives. 
Probably what is needed (and feasible) is not a grand design 
but a continued series of incremental gains.
80. SADCC has an image and a press presence in most of its 
countries and regional aspects are semi-routinely considered by 
most member States in several sectors. But with exceptions 
(e.g. the Zimbabwe TV programme "The Beira Consider") the image 
is either very general or very specialist and technical. At 
governmental and enterprise level automatically assessing the 
scope for cooperation/coordination is far from general outside 
a few flagged areas. The first problem relates in some part to 
overall press and radio quality and might be alleviated by more 
SADCC provision of, or assistance to, feature articles, radio 
programmes and TV-video tapes. The second is more serious - 
especially at enterprise level looking to the regional parallel 
to looking to the national and before looking outside remains a 
minority perspective. Time may help overcome this - especially 
if trade takes off - but some programmed help to speed it up 
would appear to be needed.
81. Getting trade moving is a key problem. Actual quasi - balanced 
frame trade target agreements operated by enterprises with 
trade expanding provisions for clearing imbalances need to be 
experimented with well beyond the increasingly common trade 
related cross credit lines at central banks. Simplification 
and harmonisation of documentation (an UNCTAD led achievement 
but one backed and facilitated by SADCC) needs to be
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complemented with some form of preferential import licensing. 
Trade information exchange and cross promotion need to go 
beyond the rather inchoate governmental and Chamber of Commerce 
channels now used and the trade fairs blessed by SADCC and PTA. 
The offers of finance for regionally linked national funds to 
cover pre-export imports into production and to allow 90-270 
day trade credit should be refined, agreed and brought into 
operation promptly. SADCC states should under no circumstances 
discriminate against other members in favour of outside states. 
Growth in trade - especially trade among pairs of states not 
including Zimbabwe - should be a priority as that habit and 
successful experience can begin to create a cumulative process 
(as it has for Zimbabwe for whom the SADCC region is now an 
export market larger than any single non-SADCC state). The 
value of regional sourcing (that the purpose of exports is to 
secure needed imports at reasonable prices not to earn hard 
currency as an end in itself) needs to be stressed. It is 
increasingly intellectually accepted but does not inform most 
trade ministry practice.
82. Dependence reduction falls into three parts: technical 
personnel, finance for SADCC institutions and funding for 
projects. The barriers to cross hiring of non-national 
regional personnel for coordination units have been overcome 
but the scarcity of citizen technical professionals and states 
limited willingness to spare their scarce, best people make 
this area one requiring regular attention and a long hard slog 
(as in national technical institutions). The institutional 
finance issue is the other side of the same coin - local 
professionals can be included in budgets levels that (given 
results to date) have become acceptable, expatriate salaries 
and allowances cannot.
8 3. Project finance - and more especially forex - will remain a 
requirement for the foreseeable future, for SADCC as for most 
of its member States. Indeed as by their nature SADCC projects 
are larger and more import intensive than most, the need will 
be particularly acute. It can be eroded as external balance 
and state revenue positions improve and as less poor states
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contribute to projects of interest to them in poorer states (as 
Botswana has begun to do) but not eliminated. Possibly the 
local resources should not be spread to reduce the average 
share of external finance but concentrated to implement 
projects SADCC thinks highest priority but for which no 
external financiers can be secured. That would help break the 
only real constraining influence the cooperating partners have 
on the Programme of Action - implementation veto (even if not 
so intended) by failure to finance.
84. Several coordinating units' quality and quantity of personnel 
and of programme/project preparation are inadequate and one or 
two others are rather routinised and limited. Arguably 
progress in two key sectors (trade, manufacturing) has been 
impeded and in one (food security) made less creative by these 
weaknesses. The problem is recognised by SADCC officials and 
member States. Peer pressure may have some results as may 
mobilisation of initial external personnel and finance (to hire 
national or regional consultants and consultancy institutions).
8 5. In some cases resolving differences while preserving a 
substantial agreed programme requires spending time - e.g. for 
the success of coordination in other areas to increase the 
perceived value of moving forward and for quiet, unpressured 
reassessment of positions. That was the case in respect to 
trade over 1980-86. But in others, less relaxed time tabling 
and more frequent dialogues would be useful - especially when 
external cooperation is on offer and may lose interest and/or 
the sector has come to be the next on critical path dynamic 
progress projections. It is hard not to list trade over 1 9 8 7- 
88 as having come to lie in that category. Food security (and 
commercial) trade in grain arguably is similar but the costs of 
inaction and the likelihood of external finance are so much 
lower that the political capital worth employing to gain a 
positive decision is significantly less.
86. SADCC and the PTA have reached a state of mildly amicable 
communication and a cautious parallelism avoiding overt clashes 
in activities. This is an improvement on the strident 
statements by PTA officials attacks (open or private) on SADCC
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and deep suspicion of SADCC officials for PTA which
characterised the 19 8 2 -8 5 period but it is inherently unstable 
and fails to win a permanent, mutually useful division of
labour. The elements of such a division can be sketched:
a. all SADCC member States join PTA to avoid being torn
between Lusaka Declaration and PTA Treaty obligations;
b. PTA explore (and if essential amend treaty to allow) closer
relations among sub-groups of its members analogous to
Benelux in EEC;
c. SADCC continue to eschew tariff preferences or standard
clearing houses of its own - a clear gain if all its
members were PTA members;
d. PTA centre its early warning system development and its
transport coordination work or its northern and Indian 
Ocean members (Tanzania through Ethiopia) and on maritime 
transport with regular consultations with the SADCC
regional early warning system and with SATCC;
e. SADCC concentrate on frame balanced or semi balanced trade 
expansion targets implemented by enterprises and liaise 
with PTA on information exchange (especially among 
enterprises and Chambers of Commerce) and trade promotion 
(not limited to trade fairs);
f. PTA and SADCC explore jointly whether SADCC's proto export 
finance funds and PTA's unfinanced trade and development 
bank could usefully be merged as a joint (or an 
independent) institution or whether both should be 
developed in parallel (and, if so, with what division of 
labour).
8 7. Technically such a division of labour is not hard to delineate 
nor to demonstrate to be useful to both organisations. The
problem is one of reinforcing mutual trust and will to 
negotiate. This is an area in which SADCC's Summit might 
usefully take the initiative as six are also members of the PTA
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Summit and SADCC as the stronger organisation can best afford 
to take an initiative toward achieving coordinated division of 
labour.
88. RSA's proxy terrorism, sabotage and transport leverage strategy 
against SADCC was - at least in its 1981-86 form-nearing 
collapse as 1988 ended. The problem is that RSA is unlikely 
quietly to retreat into laager behind its own borders even if 
it does cease to block Namibian independence (which even with a 
treaty signed is less than certain). Some options based on use 
of RSA's airpower (potentially dominant except in Angolan 
skies) plus its long range strike kommando units could be 
highly damaging to SADCC's work. Others - e.g. a halt to trade 
with RSA - would (once three Indian Ocean port routes are 
operating fairly normally) be minor nuisances to SADCC and 
economically very damaging to RSA. Pretoria gazing is not a 
science - or to date even a fine art - so that SADCC's problem 
is to avoid being lulled by a relatively tranquil period and 
unprepared for a new upsurge of aggression (as happened over 
1979-81).
8 9. Other external factors: terms of trade, weather, external 
finance flows can also affect SADCC seriously. The first 
requirement is alertness leading to prompt response. About 
terms of trade SADCC can do little but it can help to mobilise 
early international support and use regional surplus country 
reserves to reduce drought impact and continue to use 
Secretariat trips and the Annual Conference to reinforce and 
build on the generally positive attitudes of external 
cooperating partners providing finance.
VII.
Prospects: Grounds for Cautious Optimism
90. SADCC's prospects give grounds for cautious optimism. It has 
made substantive progress despite a concerted and sustained 
South African attempt to destroy it; has maintained and built 
up member State commitment over a period when they were under
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great economic and strategic strain; has enhanced its 
capabilities and reputation when most institutions and 
enterprises in its region were moving in the opposite direction 
and has attracted growing external fund commitments and 
disbursals when overall net flows to its region were stagnant. 
With the experience of almost a decade of final preparation, 
launching and operation and success during a very difficult 
initial period, SADCC should be able to continue to forge 
ahead.
91. One type of positive prospect is for more of the same - i.e. 
continued project refinement, financing and completion in main 
present sectors i.e. Transport and Communications, Agriculture, 
Energy and more policy coordination and training. That is a 
useful project, several thousand million $ of work on priority 
projects remains to be accomplished.
92. A second positive prospect is for growing visible payoffs from 
extant and newly completed projects. Until the end of 1986 it 
was easy to doubt that port corridor investment was paying off 
- as of the end of 1988 it is much more evident that it is.
93* Probably the industrial sector will become a more effective
mobilising device for funds and partners in enterprise
rehabilitation and selected new production units. A
breakthrough to more systematic indicative regional planning 
for large factories in key sectors is possible over a 9 to 6 
year time perspective. Similarly trade - led by export
finance, information buildup and industrial sector successes 
should grow from k% to perhaps 8 to 10% of total external trade 
before 1 9 9 5*
94. External dependence in technical/professional personnel and
consultants will fall at least as a per cent of total SADCC 
professionals albeit absolutely expanded functions may make new 
expatriates parallel citizenisation/regionalisation of posts 
for some years. That trend will also raise the SADCC States' 
share of institutional finance. Dependence on external project 
finance cannot decline much until some years after peace and
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higher export growth are achieved. 75/» import/foreign finance 
dependence for projects by 1995 would be a possible but 
slightly optimistic projection.
95- Gradual - but not dramatic and uniform - progress in
coordinating unit/sectoral programme quality and quantity is
likely. In certain cases of secondary sectors if it is not 
achieved within 3 to  ^ years those sectors are likely to 
atrophy.
9 6. Relations with the PTA are likely to remain at least formally 
correct and moderately amicable. Whether a breakthrough to 
substantive cooperation based on an agreed division of labour 
can be achieved in the early 1 9 9 0's is less clear.
97- South African's post 1986 retreat, while subject to short run
counterattack and temporary resurgences, is unlikely to be
reversed. Both the sabotage and terrorism and the transport 
coercion are likely to be significantly lower by 1995 than 
today. The exception to this would cause were the Angola- 
Namibia agreements to collapse or the USA radically to step up 
its support for the UNITA terrorists.
98. Whether drought and terms of trade deterioration will hit the 
SADCC region harder over 1989~95 than over I98I-88 is rather 
unpredictable. The prospect for a slightly less fraught period 
seems fairly good if only because 1981-88 was so dreadful. 
External support for the region and for SADCC in particular has 
been growing since I985 and that trend seems likely to 
continue.
99- On balance therefore SADCC's prospects over 1989-95 can be
viewed:
a. as moderately to quite promising;
b. building on past areas of success and probably broadening 
them;
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c. backed by continued external support but with marginal
increases in financial (and significant in personnel) self 
reliance;
d. but still at risk from RSA, weather and world economy
shocks.
e. and unlikely to make a dramatic breakthrough to full 
coordination of indicative planning or a rise in the
intertrade share of total external trade much above 10%.
VIII.
SADCC and PTA: Diversity and Potential Complementarity
100. SADCC and PTA are very different institutions in history,
structure, style, focuses, developmental strategy and
performance. On balance it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusions that to date SADCC has been the more successful and 
that tensions (initially from the PTA side) between the two 
bodies have held back the work of both. However, both bodies 
are facts which are most unlikely to go away and, while a total
merge would be impracticable and probably undesirable, very
substantial room for coordination and division of labour 
exists.
101. Basically PTA is a common market centred, other sectors tacked
on, economic community modelled after EEC and the Ardean Pact. 
It was promoted by ECA which dominated the somewhat 
discontinuous negotiations over 1966-82 which led to its 
creation and provided most of the initial secretariat. PTA
therefore in legal form, development strategy, institutional 
structure and personnel was an import to Southern Africa 
whereas SADCC was and is a domestic/regional product. Whatever 
the virtues of imports - and often they are substantial - they
' frequently need adaptation and modification to a new context,
the failure to include which in PTA is arguably a significant 
factor in PTA's less and slower than anticipated results. True 
worsening economic conditions and reduce foreign exchange
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supplies have more directly constricted PTA's trade focus than 
SADCC's infrastructure and production ones, but had PTA had (or 
adopted) a more two way-semi balanced trade expansion approach 
as opposed to a traditional preferential to common market free 
trade one it might have fared better.
102. PTA's institutional structure is formally similar to SADCC's on 
the decision taking but not the secretariat side. It has a 
Summit with Ministerial and Official Councils plus sectoral 
Ministerial/Official meetings. However, the Secretariat is 
unified (without sectoral units coordinated by states) and in 
practice is the dominant setter of agendas, proposer of 
projects and drafter of resolutions. This does promote speedy 
decisions on and adoption of resolutions but it also reduces 
state involvement in the programming process and commitment to 
decisions taken.
103. PTA is not in practice project centred because in the absence 
of coordinated financial mobilisation there has been little 
incentive to hammer out serious priority project lists or to 
support their implementation. This weakness has been 
exacerbated because SADCC does have such mechanisms so that the 
7 SADCC members who are PTA members clearly do not take the 
latter very seriously as a project coordination forum. PTA has 
altered its earlier rigid stance against being involved in 
external finance raising but to date has mobilised very limited 
amounts of finance for its own institutions (e.g. trade banks) 
or state projects encompassed in its programmes.
10^ . The PTA's present eligible membership forms a quadrilateral
from Angola to Lesotho to Mauritius to Ethiopia. As states 
bordering the PTA can be added to it Zaire and the Sudan are 
potentially eligible. Membership has grown but Botswana, 
Angola, Madagascar and the Seychelles have not joined to date. 
Geographically the PTA region falls into three groupings - 
SADCC, the Northern PTA (with Tanzania overlapping the two) and 
the Indian Ocean zone. However, geo politically and 
economically only the first zone is homogeneous (apart from 
residual or tentative links among Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Tanzania within the Northern Zone). While in the
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early 1980's accession/ non-accession arguably turned partly on 
socialist transition/capitalist issues this is no longer the 
case.
105. PTA's focus is on trade and trade facilitation by:
a. preferential tariffs moving by phases to a (merchandise) 
common market;
b. operation of a standard, hard currency settlement, short 
term clearing house for transactions among member states;
c. preferential relaxation/removal of import licensing among 
members;
d. operation of a trade finance bank.
In the form set out in the PTA treaty these are very much the 
standard "second best", neo classical, industrial economy 
common market’s standard institutionalisation in pursuit of 
static/short run efficiency gains from competition, broadened 
complementarity (new products) and marginal adjustments in 
national production structures.
106. The PTA’s economic integration strategy centres in these focal 
areas. In addition its treaty provides - rather vaguely 
compared to the great specificity and detailed transitional 
timetable on trade issues - for sectoral work to facilitate 
trade through improved transport and communications, joint 
planning of industrial development, mutual agricultural base 
strengthening etc.
107. On dependency reduction the PTA has two instruments:
a. preferential tariffs and exchange control/licensing 
regulations;
b. limiting goods qualifying as regional to firms owned, 
directed and managed primarily by PTA nationals.
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South Africa had little place in PTA strategy until 1 9 8 7. 
Since then PTA has sought to identify regional sources/markets 
which could replace South African in the event of RSA or 
globally initiated trade sanctions. It has in this case de 
f acto proposed a division of labour with SADCC/SATCC by 
assuming some other body has first resolved the transportation 
and communication system barriers to intra-regional trade.
108. PTA was exclusivist. It held that overlapping organisational 
memberships were antithetical to effective common markets. In 
the Eastern and Southern African context that is not self 
evident. Neither SADCC and the Kagera Basin Authority has nor 
proposes to have preferential tariffs nor a standard clearing 
house. Thus so long as all of their members are PTA members 
(not now - or not yet - true of SADCC) there is no necessity of 
overlapping membership proving incompatible in its obligations. 
(So long as some SADCC member States are not PTA members there 
is a conflict between SADCC/PTA members prior obligations under 
the Lusaka Declaration of 1980 to treat each other favourably 
in trade and the potential obligations under the 19 8 1 PTA 
treaty to discriminate against not PTA member States of SADCC.)
109. The PTA has begun and continued operations nominally from I98I 
(the treaty) and effectively from 1984 (the Clearing House). A 
not insignificant body of functioning programmes, some key 
conflicts resolved and proposals for further action have been 
accomplished. In these regards PTA has apparently gone 
further, faster than its West and Central African analogues. 
However, it is a fact that progress has been less rapid than 
hoped and that both state and business interest in and hope for 
PTA have tended to decline even in its care proponents 
(Zimbabwe and Kenya, the dominant exporters, and Zambia, the 
host state) and that it has a much hazier public image than 
SADCC and a more limited habit of "thinking PTA" than of 
"thinking SADCC". Arguably this is inevitable for a trade 
focussed body in the Eastern and Southern African context. 
Gains from trade are slow to become large, unevenly divided and 
not readily perceived by the politician in his office, the man 
in the street or the woman in the field. However that, if
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true, does raise doubts as to the political wisdom of
concentrating so heavily (at least initially) on the trade
sector.
110. In brief PTA's achievements are:
a. a preferential list (being expanded) providing for sizeable 
tariff reductions on the bulk of regional trade (which, 
however, is only about 3# of total external trade and still 
dominated by the traditional Nairobi and Harare centres);
b. a regional clearing house providing for 90 day settlement 
of balances in hard currency which - with limited 
exceptions-does clear (but in practice handles about 10# of 
intra-member transactions).
c. founding a trade development bank to mobilise member and 
extra regional capital to promote regional trade (which 
unfortunately has remained non-operational because very 
little capital in convertible currencies has to date been 
forthcoming though discussions - e.g. with the ADB - now 
look more promising);
d. simplifying and harmonising transit traffic regulations 
(led, however, by UNCTAD and equally promoted by SADCC);
e. pushing ahead with the Northern (Kenya - Uganda - Rwanda - 
Burundi - Zaire) and Central Tanzania - Landlocked States 
transport corridors (albeit this has really been 
implemented and finance mobilised by the pre-existing 
"corridor groups" of directly interested states);
f. amending the time periods and rules relating to regional 
ownership - direction - management to avert a conflict over 
"deregionalising" over half of existing trade in 
manufactures at the end of the transition period;
g. proposing various regional projects in other sectors 
including an (agricultural/meteorological) early warning 
system (unfortunately largely overlapping SADCC's and, 
largely for that reason, stillborn).
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The reasons for at best mixed feelings about results to date 
even by ardent PTA and regional integration advocates are 
perhaps evident from this tentative progress report.
111. On the other hand considerable scope for complementarity with 
SADCC emerges (and has been referred to in respect to specific 
steps under the SADCC Problematics and Prospects sections) from 
the very differences between the two institutions. A base for 
a genuine division of labour does appear to exist.
112. Tariff reduction and clearing house type measures probably are 
best served by as large a geographic and economic regional size 
as possible. A Khartoum to Maseru, Kinshasa to Port Louis, PTA 
would have a distinct comparative advantage over SADCC in this 
field. If all SADCC member States were to join PTA no conflict 
need arise.
113. Closer coordination leading to sectoral regional indicative 
planning requires a smaller, more homogeneous group of states. 
SADCC has a clear comparative advantage here in principle and 
in results to date.
114. Geographically PTA has two sub-regions (Northern and Indian 
Ocean) SADCC does not include. Land transport and an early 
warning system in the Northern and maritime transport and an 
early warning system in Indian Ocean sub-region would appear to 
be useful areas for PTA action promotion and coordination. 
Once that was accomplished coordination with SATCC and SADCC's 
already largely operational regional early warning system (for 
which Tanzania which overlaps the SADCC - Northern PTA sub- 
regions forms a natural hinge) would be valuable.
115. In certain fields e.g. trade finance it is unclear whether 
complementary joint or autonomous institutions would be 
optimal. Arguably SADCC's regionally linked trade promotion 
fund proposals (which seem sure to be financed once defined) 
and PTA's trade bank (detailed and set up but not yet financed) 
should be merged albeit a series of mutual confidence building 
steps in other areas would need to preceed such action. 
Analogously some aspects of industrial (e.g. basic steel
rcapacity?) and transport (e.g. regional airline based on 
coordination or merger of Ethiopian, Kenyan and Zimbabwean 
airlines?) coordination may work better if they are carried out 
on a PTA wide rather than a SADCC, Northern, Indian Ocean sub­
regional basis).
116. The need is to establish a process of exploration and dialogue 
among the two organisations at Secretariat, national official 
and Council of Ministers levels within a clear mandate to 
achieve complementarity and division of labour. Given their 
overlaps the effective source of such a mandate would appear to 
be the PTA and SADCC Summits.
117. If such an approach works it may provide inputs into a process
of increasing the effectiveness of the efforts toward
continental economic integration SADCC's experience suggests 
small, closely linked production/perceived mutual preference 
foundations are important building blocks toward economic 
cooperation and integration while PTA's indicates preferential 
tariffs can be brought into operation but without supporting 
measures may have limited practical results. These experiences 
may imply that the Lagos Plan’s commitment to continental 
economic integration should be reaffirmed but ways, means,
sequences and target dates reconsidered with more attention to 
smaller groupings building toward coordinated regional planning 
and to measures to complement preferential trading and clearing 
arrangements.
r
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